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ABSTRACT 
Safety regulations and standards imposed by national 
regulators on nuclear power plant systems provide high-
level requirements, recommendations and/or guidance 
expressed in natural language. In many cases, this leaves a 
large margin for interpretation, not all of which are 
acceptable to a given regulator. Currently the elements that 
lead to the establishment of acceptable/accepted practices 
are not always documented, nor are these practices formally 
modeled. When a new standard appears or when Electricité 
de France (EDF) has to discuss a standard with another 
regulator, there is no systematic process to build a practice. 
Domain-specific modeling, traceability and variability 
modeling are Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) techniques 
that could address various aspects of practice formalization. 
This paper precisely defines the modeling issues that are 
currently faced by EDF when managing regulatory safety 
requirements, standards and practices. Then we review 
existing requirements modeling techniques to understand 
their benefits and limits according to EDF’s needs. 
 
Keywords: requirements, standards, regulations, safety, 
practice, variability, traceability, modeling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Longlife critical installations such a nuclear power plants 
are designed and developed with safety concerns. The 
objective is to ensure an acceptably low level of residual risk 
regarding incidents or accidents, and that procedures do exist 
to face them. Finally, it also deals with minimizing the 
impact of such events on people, on the environment and on 
the installation.  
To handle this safety concern, from design to licensing 
with respect to a given safety authority, a licensee must 
comply with the national regulatory requirements and 
guidelines, and often follows the requirements and 
recommendations of standards and/or technical codes to 
support their work. 
 Unfortunately, these documents only provide high-level 
guidance, leading both licensee and authority to seek a 
common interpretation of their contents. This common 
interpretation, which may evolve over time, defines the basis 
of the nuclear safety practice at a specific moment, in a 
specific country.  
Unfortunately all of these relations between standards, 
regulations and practice are rarely formalized. This is an 
issue to understand the impact of the evolution of all these 
elements and also to keep a homogeneous and global trace of 
this knowledge, which is actually split and partially shared 
between several different human experts.  
 Model-based systems-engineering is a major jump from 
the natural language and document-centric approach to the 
formalized application of modeling to support the full system 
life-cycle, from requirements to decommissioning. Our 
research question is the following one: Can we use MDE to 
model the practice through the formal representation of the 
relations between standards, regulations and their 
interpretations?  
In this paper, we aim to define the requirements 
management problem for the construction and modernization 
of nuclear power plants. We illustrate different facets of this 
problem through the historical analysis of the development 
of Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems at EDF. Then 
we review some existing requirements modeling approaches 
and identify gaps that we will have to handle in our future 
works. The remainder of the paper is organized as following: 
Section 2 describes our industrial context and the lessons we 
can learn from three tightly linked stories regarding I&C 
systems developments. In section 3, we propose to define 
some of the variability dimensions, the relations we expect to 
find and our objectives regarding this problem of variability 
in practices and knowledge formalization. Section 4 
proposes a quick roundtrip of the research domains that are 
crosscutting to our problem with a particular focus on how 
we can model requirements dependencies. We finally discuss 
around the paper and perspectives of our future works in 
section 5. 
II. ON STANDARDS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 
A. EDF  context 
EDF (Electricité de France) is the national electricity 
provider in France and owns and operates a fleet of 58 
nuclear power units. Besides the continuous maintenance 
and surveillance during operation, the systems of a unit may 
be replaced or upgraded during the periodic outages that are 
necessary for refueling and inspection. Such changes are 
under close regulatory scrutiny and subject to approval from 
the concerned safety authorities.  
Experience from the field, technological progress or 
societal evolutions may lead authorities to modify their 
expectations regarding the different systems. Consequently, 
they ask the licensee to justify the system’s safety based on 
new or modified criteria.  
Safety justifications are grounded on technical arguments 
justifying technological choices, design decisions but also 
rely on practices that have been accepted in previous 
projects. 
B. Building practice, three short  EDF stories 
To better understand this context, we propose to tell three 
stories related to the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) 
systems of EDF nuclear power plants. We first briefly 
describe two concepts important to our problem background: 
the first is the concept of series; the second is the safety 
classification. After these stories, we finally highlight several 
considerations that appeared along them. 
1) General background 
In France, EDF nuclear power units are built in series. 
The units of a series have the same general design, with 
relatively minor differences to take account of the specific 
site constraints. For example, the cooling systems need to 
take consideration of whether the unit is on the seashore, 
along a big river, or along a small river. There are currently 
four main series: the “900MW” series has 34 units, the 
“1300MW” series has 20 units, the “N4” series (1450MW) 
has 4 units, and the EPR (Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor) 
series has one unit still under construction.  
A large number of functions are necessary to operate a 
nuclear power unit, and guarantee its safety. Functions are 
categorized (A, B, C or Not Classified) based on their 
importance to safety, category A functions being the most 
important to safety, and Not Classified functions being those 
that are not important to safety. In parallel to functions 
categorization, the I&C systems are classified based on the 
categories of the functions they implement. 
As mentioned earlier, each system important to safety 
(i.e., implementing at least one category A, B or C function) 
goes through a safety justification process. In general, the 
safety authority lets EDF propose and present its solution 
and then decides whether the solution is acceptable or needs 
to be improved. 
2) Standards as parts of safety justification 
a) Introducing innovation in I&C system developments 
In the early 90’s, EDF was busy designing and 
developing its new N4 series, including the corresponding 
I&C systems. Based on the experience of the 1300MW 
series, EDF decided to use digital, microprocessor-based 
I&C systems for nearly all I&C functions.  
At that time, there was no written French regulatory 
requirements regarding digital I&C systems important to 
safety, and the only existing international standard to 
support this process was the International Electrotechnical 
Commission 60880 standard, released in 1986 (IEC60880-
1986). This standard deals with software for computers in 
safety systems of nuclear power units. EDF’s position was 
to apply this standard to develop the software of systems 
performing category “A” functions. In parallel, for the 
systems performing functions of a lower safety category (B 
or C), there was no guidance; and EDF had to propose a 
safety justification approach from scratch. 
The French safety authority (ASN) and its technical 
support organization (IPSN) required that particular 
recommendations of IEC 60880 be mandatory and be 
considered as requirements. Also, after lengthy discussion, 
EDF and IPSN agreed on an acceptable practical 
interpretation for a number of 'fuzzy' requirements. This 
story highlights the role of standards, regulations and the 
way practice is built through the interpretation of the corpus 
of documents which are used for such projects. 
b) Dealing with standards evolutions 
Since 1986, a number of additional standards have been 
published. They address the general requirements for I&C 
systems (IEC 61513), safety categorization and 
classification (IEC 61226), hardware requirements (IEC 
60987), and software for I&C systems performing category 
B or C functions (IEC 62138), data communication (IEC 
61500), common-cause failure (IEC 62340), etc. During the 
same period, ASN/IPSN considered that with the N4 
project, they had gained enough experience regarding 
software important to safety, and issued a high level 
regulatory document, “Basic Safety Rule: Software for 
electric systems important to safety” (RFS II.4.1.a - 2000). 
In this document, it is mentioned that, in some specific 
requirements, conformance to specific clauses of IEC60880 
is considered an acceptable practice. However, the Basic 
Safety Rule has been issued before many of the other IEC 
standards were published, and therefore it makes no mention 
of them. It is now an unwritten understanding that these 
newer standards also constitute acceptable practices. 
c) Managing evolutions from N4 to EPR I&C systems 
The EPR program for the first unit of the series (to be 
built in Flamanville) followed the N4 program (advanced 
discussions started at the end of the 90s). The overall 
architecture and design for I&C systems is based on what 
had been proposed and accepted in the N4 program, with 
however a number of significant changes. Firstly, the EPR 
I&C is based on different products, many of those used for 
N4 being no longer available, and industrial alliances 
between suppliers having changed since N4. Secondly, a 
number of IEC standards issued since N4 (such as IEC 
62138 for software of I&C systems performing category B 
or C functions) are now applicable. 
However, the most significant change (as far as this 
paper is concerned) is the emergence of products and 
technologies that were not used for N4, and for which there 
is no precedent and no standard. In particular, this is the 
case for what is commonly called 'smart components' such 
as smart sensors or smart power supplies. (They are said to 
be smart due to the presence of embedded microcontrollers 
that allow capabilities and functions that cannot be provided 
otherwise, but that raise the same concerns in terms of 
safety justification as software.) 
For these emerging technologies, new safety justification 
approaches need to be proposed from scratch. 
3) Standards interpretation and regulation in different 
contexts 
Born from a European program, the EPR design had 
been expected to be built on several countries: France, 
Finland, the United-Kingdom, and the US in particular. The 
case of the UK is particularly interesting. The British safety 
authorities reference the same set of IEC standards as 
France. However, the acceptable practices on both sides of 
the Channel differ on some significant points and lead to 
differences in I&C architectures. 
In particular, safety approaches in the UK rely in large 
part on probabilistic approaches, whereas in France 
probabilistic analyses are considered as complementary 
sources for safety demonstration. Consequently, the safety 
justification for the same item has to be done twice, in two 
different ways. 
This story clearly highlights the gaps between different 
practices and the gaps between the possible interpretations 
of the same documents. 
4) Conforming to different standards and regulations 
Now, EDF wishes to build EPR units in the USA. US 
authorities provide detailed written regulatory requirements 
and guidance (contrary to France were only very high level 
Basic Safety Rules are issued). Also, the standards endorsed 
by the US authorities are not the IEC standards cited earlier, 
but IEEE documents. In this case, this is not only a subset of 
requirements interpretation that will differ but the full 
content of the provided documents to support the different 
developments. 
 Comparing each IEC standard with its approximate 
relevant IEEE correspondent is difficult, time consuming 
and does not ensure to have the correct interpretation (the 
one that will make consensus among all stakeholders) of the 
different standards. 
Difficulties can arise from:  
 Vocabulary: terms are not the same. IEC60880 
speaks about activities and IEEE1012 considers 
tasks. 
 Semantics: In the end, are we talking about the 
same thing when using “task” and “activity”? 
 Ambiguity: Legal documents and standards 
contain intended and unintended ambiguity [1], 
causing interpretation, misunderstanding and 
negotiation between stakeholders to agree on a 
common definition. 
 Scope: IEC60880 standard covers all the 
software lifecycle, whereas the IEEEstd1012 
focuses only on software validation and 
verification and needs to be completed with 
other references. 
The key question in this case is to know whether EDF’s 
EPR solutions can comply with US regulations without 
having to design a brand new solution. 
C. Synthesis 
The first story tells us the differences and also the tight 
relations between standards, which are used as guidelines to 
fulfill safety requirements. It also partially describes 
practices that arise from a particular understanding and use 
of standards. The second story explains the introduction of 
several practices based on the same reference documents. 
The last story presents the case of one system that needs to 
comply with two different sets of reference documents. 
Figure 1 offers an overview of the evolution of some 
available references (standards and regulatory documents) 
regarding several safety related software systems. It also 
shows how EDF had and still has to deal with them for its 
projects. A summary of these three stories should highlight 
the multiple variability dimensions we have to deal with to 
tackle these questions of standard interpretations in multiple 
contexts. 
III. ON DEFINITIONS,  OBJECTIVES AND VARIABILITY 
In the following, we define and explain some more 
terms. We then propose a first global overview of our 
problem, our objectives and make a particular focus on 
some of the variability dimensions we highlighted. 
A. Definitions 
The three more definitions we provide highlight 
properties on documents or document elements, context 
elements that will appear while defining our problem. 
1) Standard 
We adopt the definition of the BSI [2]. A standard is a 
summary of best practice and is created by bringing together 
experiences and expertise of stakeholders on a specific 
topic. It contains a specification designed to be used as a 
rule, guideline or definition in order to increase reliability, 
effectiveness and confidence. Standards aim to provide a 
verifiable and reusable way to answer a problem. 
One important point is that standards are designed for 
voluntary use. However, laws and regulations may refer to 
standards and make compliance with them mandatory. 
There exist several organizations involved in the 
standardization process like the ANSI, BSI, IEEE, IEC … 
Regarding nuclear I&C systems, there are mainly two 
organizations that are the US IEEE’s Nuclear  Power 
Engineering Committee (NPEC), and the IEC subcommittee 
on Reactor Instrumentation (SC45A). In [6], the author has 
compared IEEE and IEC standards collections in the domain 
of nuclear energy. Unfortunately, it is only an attempt to 
find alignments at the global document level. It does not 
provide relevant information on specific difference of 
interpretation that may arise between different practices nor 
provide a fine-grained overview of these alignments/gaps. 
The main difficulty is to analyze and compare different 
interpretations across different scopes and different 
terminologies. One example of this kind of analysis can be 
the comparison of the two previously cited standards 
(IEEEstd1012 and IEC60880).  
2) Practice  
There are many possible and correct solutions to tackle a 
problem. Practice is defined as the provided and accepted 
solution to a specific problem: the way this solution was 
designed, the complete process it followed (eventually, the 
compliance to a standard), how it was justified. The main 
property of this solution is that it had been endorsed by the 
local nuclear safety authority. As a consequence, several 
different practices may exist, depending of each country, 
depending also on past projects. 
3) On requirements, recommendation and guidance 
Many different definitions exist for a requirement. 
According to IEEE610.12-1990 a requirement is: 
1. A condition or capability needed by a user to solve 
a problem or achieve an objective. 
2. A condition or capability that must be met or 
possessed by a system or system component to 
satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other 
formally imposed document. 
3. A documented representation of a condition or 
capability as in 1 or 2. 
Many other definitions/decompositions exist: 
considering for instance functional or non functional 
properties, specific domain requirements. We have to 
distinguish here between what is mandatory, what is 
optional and the range between these two statuses. A 
requirement is mandatory. A recommendation is optional 
but should be done. In the standard, there exist three terms 
(and their synonyms) defining this degree of obligation. 
“Must” or “shall” define requirements. Recommendations 
may be determined by the word “should”. The word “may” 
also has another meaning as permission, even semantically 
weaker than the other statements, and the final conformance 
evaluation is made regarding these different levels. 
There is also a major difference between regulatory 
requirements coming from regulation and standards 
requirements coming from standards. Regulatory 
requirements are imposed by the nuclear safety authority 
and one has to comply with if he wants to conform to the 
law. A standard requirement may become a regulatory 
requirement when the authority imposes to follow this 
standard with its own interpretation of the document. 
Regulatory guidance is guidance provided by authority 
and which are not part of the regulatory sources. However, 
due to the risks and uncertainties entailed by solutions that 
do not conform to the guidance, regulatory guidelines are 
considered most of time as requirements. 
B. Objectives 
The three stories demonstrate that EDF has to: 
 follow the evolution of standards (story 1), that 
represent the best of the state of the art 
regarding one question and that help to justify to 
an authority the system’ safety; 
 understand the interpretation of these documents 
(standards, guides, regulatory documents) in 
several contexts (parameterized by time and 
geographical location) to provide acceptable 
practices (stories 1 and 2); 
 deals with much more than simple requirements 
to fulfill; 
 Know and analyze the impact of documentation 
changes (stories 1 and 3) in order to provide 
adapted solutions according to several contexts 
(story 2). 
Actually, all of these aspects remain mainly split between 
several human experts. As a consequence, one country’s 
practice and its relations with other practices are not 
formalized, not capitalized and highly dependent from 
resource management. Worse, no one possesses a complete 
global view of this knowledge. Considering that these kinds 
of projects last for decades (many initial years of design, the 
40 years of operation and the several years of 
decommissioning), the question of knowledge management 
becomes a significant question. 
To tackle this issue, we want to propose a domain 
specific modeling language to represent the variability of the 
Figure 1 Evolutions of some available references and use during projects 
different practices and their implicit relationships. That way, 
we will be able to formalize and capitalize experts’ 
knowledge on several different practices and propose a 
global reference guide for current and future IDF’s I&C 
systems projects. Moreover it will improve traceability 
aspects by formalizing the existing dependencies between 
the different project’s elements. 
C. Variability dimensions 
The previous three stories illustrated the need to model 
multiple, changing elements. According to these stories and 
in order to start formalizing the problem, we modularize the 
approach into areas. We describe these areas first. Next 
section focuses on the dependencies between the elements of 
these areas and finish by describing a possible example. 
Figure 2 summarizes our current understanding of the 
different elements involved and their relationships. We can 
distinguish between three main concerns: setting up the 
corpus of formalized documents, binding these documents 
to the contexts they are used in and finally the overall 
project whose aim is to build and qualify a solution relating 
to the documents used in the different contexts the project 
wants to address.  
We choose to focus in this paper only on the corpus part, 
its interpretation in particular contexts and the relations they 
hold. 
1) The corpus  area 
This domain contains information on all referenced 
documents independently of any context. As said earlier, 
information can be provided on the type of each document 
(standard, regulatory text, technical note as exposed 
before…). Elements can be described in a hierarchical way 
including containment in sections and subsections. 
Paragraphs may be typed as definitions, requirements, 
recommendations or permission using text patterns. 
References can be captured; information notes can be 
associated with their parent paragraphs. 
2) The interpretation area 
Once the document is split and structured in hierarchical 
typed fragments, the text fragments are eventually 
interpreted to build a new element, considered as the 
“operational” one when used in one or several contexts. In 
this area, a paragraph determined as a recommendation can 
be considered as a requirement due to its interpretation in a 
specific context. Another possibility is to have to rewrite the 
initial text description of a fragment into another one that 
represents its interpretation. In fact, this domain depicts the 
contextual practice relating to these documents and the 
variable part of the document elements. 
3) The referential area 
We have introduced the notion of context. The context is 
a pair <country, period> describing the validity of the 
interpretation: geographically and temporally. Although 
these fragments remain typed textual fragments and close 
from the definition of the documentation domain; the major 
difference, at this level, consists of the semantics added 
because it now reflects the way they are interpreted within 
the real context and not only the artificial nature that an 
algorithm has decided. The referential area contains all these 
contexts that should be addressed while interpreting 
documents.  
D. About  dependencies 
We use the term dependency to describe the relations 
between elements of the same area or from different areas. 
An element depends on another one if it is refined by or has 
an interaction with this element [16][24]. 
Figure 2: Problem overview 
1) Refinements 
A refinement may consist of three different actions: 
 describing an element in a finer way (total or partial 
composition); 
 detailing some particular aspects of an element 
(characterization); 
 describing different ways to understand, achieve,  
fulfill an element (specialization) 
A refinement is an intra-domain relationship. The 
refinement of an element into sub elements is the 
composition. A paragraph may contain one main idea (for 
example, the existence of a precise document) and multiple 
details concerning partial aspects of this main idea (content 
of the document) or explaining, for instance, ways to achieve 
a high level objective without being enough structured to 
form an independent item. This refinement into a main idea, 
detailed by other related elements is called characterization. 
Alternatives may be given to fulfill a requirement. This is 
called specialization. 
2) Interactions 
Interactions are intra and inter areas relationships. They 
represent the different typed relations we want to represent 
and will insure traceability between the different elements, 
provide comparison operators and manage the understanding 
of changes impacts. Definitions of these relations are 
following. 
“Conflict”, “partial equivalence” and “total equivalence” 
relations express similarity or exclusion between elements. 
Partial and total equivalence express the facts that at least, 
elements hold the same general idea, partially or totally, 
without contradiction. The conflict relation expresses this 
contradiction between two elements. Obviously, this should 
be useful while comparing elements of IEC and IEEE 
standards. 
The “reference” relation express that an element is citing 
another one. Explicit and/or implicit cross-referencing is 
known to be a major issue while trying to understand the 
context of a requirement and its evolution [20]. This should 
be useful in case of changes into the referenced element. 
The “require” relation has a stronger meaning than 
“reference” although they both can be present. An element A 
requires an element B does not only means that A references 
B but that B is a mandatory element to achieve A. 
The “coverage” relation says that two elements A and B 
have the same interpretation, address the same problem (for 
example two response time requirements relating to the same 
element) but if A covers B, then A has stronger constraints or 
additional properties. 
The “assignment”, “justification” and “qualification” 
relations are the specific relations between: 
 An element from the documentation domain and an 
element from the solution domain (Assignment), i.e. 
this element of solution are constrained in some way 
by the element from the document domain (e.g. 
development driven by a standard, function 
allocation, regulatory requirement). 
 An element from the documentation domain and an 
element from the qualification domain (justification); 
 An element from the solution domain and an element 
from the qualification domain (verification). 
E. One example 
Let’s take an example of what kind of text fragments 
have to be handled and what kind of analysis can be 
performed. This example comes from the standard 
IEC60880. 
Chapter 6 of the IEC60880 deals with software 
requirements and section 6.2 deals with software self-
supervision. It contains 6 main text fragments (listed from 
6.2.A to 6.2.F). 
Fragment 6.2.A is considered as a requirement due to the 
presence of the word shall. It also makes a reference to 
annex A.2.2 section. The following sentence, as it is not in 
the same paragraph is considered as an information note 
relating to this requirement.  
Fragment 6.2.C is considered as a recommendation 
(missing shall and presence of should). Because of the non 
enumerated category list below, we face a partial 
composition of the requirement into four units. 
Fragment 6.2.D is a multiple sentences requirement due 
to the double presence of shall. It references IEC61513 
standard. The second sentence is a characterization of the 
first one. 
Ambiguity is a major actor of this kind of documents as 
expected to be used in several contexts. “6.2.A” talks about 
specified time interval. This means one has to decide the 
exact value of these time interval and has an impact on the 
final device which will be adopted. “6.2.F” talks about 
useful diagnostic information. Once again, someone has to 
decide the exact information. 
F.  Preliminary discussions 
Although the corpus modeling may appear as something 
mechanical, using specific rules, it could never be perfect. It 
could be difficult to determine whether a characterization or 
6.2 Self-supervision 
6.2.A The software of the computer-based system shall supervise the 
hardware during operation within specified time intervals and the 
software behaviour (A.2.2). 
This is considered to be a primary factor in achieving high overall 
system reliability. 
6.2.B Those parts of the memory that contain code or invariable data 
shall be monitored to detect unintended changes. 
6.2.C The self-supervision should be able to detect to the extent 
practicable: 
- Random failure of hardware components; 
- Erroneous behavior of software (e.g. deviations from specified 
software processing and operating conditions or data corruption); 
- Erroneous data transmission between different processing units. 
6.2.D If a failure is detected by the software during plant operation, 
the software shall take appropriate and timely response. Those shall 
be implemented according to the system reactions required by the 
specification and to IEC 61513 system design rules. 
This may require giving due consideration to avoiding spurious 
actuation. 
6.2.E Self-supervision shall not adversely affect the intended system 
functions. 
6.2.F It should be possible to automatically collect all useful 
diagnostic information arising from software self-supervision. 
 
a specialization is filled in the text. Distinguishing between 
a reference and a require relation may be hard to determine. 
Moreover, we have to notice that this special formatting 
is mainly unique to this standard. Standards are written at 
different times, by different persons, following different 
typographic rules that make each standard analysis an ad hoc 
process whose only good property is to provide something 
reproducible and systematic. 
As a consequence, one should be able to check, verify, 
modify the produced result in order to insure the correctness 
and the completion of this task. Moreover, traditional 
properties of elements like maturity, authors, date, 
contributors or rationales shall be also incorporated [20]. The 
way to decide the value of these properties may be far from 
obvious to decide and is part of the interpretation step of the 
process. 
This leaves us mainly with three tasks to perform and 
related operations: 
 Modeling standards by means of refinements 
modeling and elements typing; 
 Modeling variability aspects through the several 
standards contextualized interpretations of their 
elements; 
 Modeling standards dependencies by providing 
intra and inter-areas dependencies modeling 
mechanisms and supporting analysis tools. 
In next section, we review several modeling approaches 
regarding these three tasks and operations. 
IV. MODELING REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES 
Many fields of research may address these questions of 
standards requirements, variability management and tasks to 
perform to formalize practices. Figure 3 presents a roundtrip 
of all the research domains we are at the crossing of and 
some interesting keywords we retrieve all along this paper. 
While considering requirements formalization and 
representation, there exist multiple formalism using UML 
use case diagrams [23], scenarios [14], domain specific 
modeling languages [1], predicates [9], agent oriented [22] or 
goal-oriented [12][20] requirements models. Each of them 
targets a particular objective: specification, analysis, test 
generation, consistency checking.  
A complete survey of these works is not within the 
scope of this paper and we prefer to focus on some 
interesting works around two questions. First, the way 
requirements are modeled and how variability is addressed 
through these representations. Then, the kind of 
relationships with the environment these requirements 
handle. In the following, we first have a glance around one 
particular goal-oriented approach which is KAOS 
(Knowledge Acquisition in AutOmated Specification). We 
then go on with the OMG standard SysML and one of this 
standard implementation through the Topcased 
environment. We continue with one particular model-driven 
approach which is the Unicase environment and finish with 
the particular question of variability in software product 
lines and the promising Common Variability Language 
(CVL) standard. 
A. Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering using KAOS 
1) From goals to requirements 
One of the main approaches considers a goal-oriented 
approach to represent requirements. In Goal-oriented 
requirements engineering (GORE), goals are main entities 
for elicitation, elaboration, specification, analysis of 
requirements. Goals are prescriptive statements of intent 
whose satisfaction requires cooperation of agents in both 
software and its environment. Goals and their variability are 
captured in AND/OR structures which define how they are 
being refined or abstracted. A requirement is a goal assigned 
to an agent of the software-to-be. An expectation is a goal 
assigned to an agent of the environment of the software-to-
be. In KAOS [20][21], goals are mainly defined as 
behavioral goals (clear declaration of an expected behavior) 
that can be achieved, maintained, avoided or softgoals; 
whose are not clearly established and are more satisficed at 
different levels than satisfied [12]. One should not compare 
them to functional/non functional requirements which are 
part of another kind of categorization. This part provides one 
kind of typing over the different possible goals categories. 
KAOS has been used over several industrial projects and is 
fully supported by a complete platform: Objectiver [13]. 
2) Modeling goals relationships 
In KAOS, goals are not only modeled and refined in a 
sole requirements model. The whole system is represented 
into multiple dimensions which are intentional, structural, 
responsibility, functional and behavioral in order to 
completely cover the WHY-WHAT-WHO questions to the 
system. 
Through these multiple dimensions, goals and later 
requirements can be involved in relations at several levels 
[20]. These relations stand at the interface level as: 
 Responsibility links between goals and agents, 
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 Obstruction links between a goal and a obstacle 
model, 
 Concern link, that are relations between  goals 
and object of the object model, 
 Operationalization links between the goal 
model and operation model, 
 Coverage links between goal and behavior 
models. 
Concepts and relations in KAOS have to be adapted and 
specialized to fit with our problem. Document types are 
missing as it only considers goals. We may consider 
informally that sections, subsections and such kind of 
hierarchy could be refined into goals and subgoals. 
However, it does not comply completely with this notion of 
packaging. Moreover, many other different items may be 
refined as goals like requirements and recommendations as 
they are not actually assignable to any agent. This leads to a 
problem here as they are already requirements or 
recommendations. At this moment, goals and subgoals 
entities merge a lot of very different notions and it does not 
give a clear representation of the standard. The different 
range of obligations: requirements, recommendations, 
informative or normative annexes disappear and must 
appear in another way. A priority or criticity attribute should 
not be sufficient to deal with these concepts as they fit more 
during a development phase for managing purposes. 
Apart from the structure, we must also adapt KAOS 
metamodel to introduce new traceability links such as 
equivalence, coverage or reference. The conflict notion may 
be described via a conflict link and a negative participation 
even though this relationship is between two different model 
elements. We also believe that standards and regulatory 
requirements, which are not technical requirements and not 
designed to go towards development process, cannot be 
described by only using AND/OR structures. It also lacks 
elements to model the cross references questions. 
B. Modeling multi-facetted aspects using SysML 
1) General words on SysML 
SysML [17] is a standard language from the OMG, a 
general-purposes system modeling language extended from 
UML. The major drawback of UML regarding its usage was 
that it was felt as to close to software engineering and did not 
fit for system modeling purposes. The main changes 
(relevant to our case) are the introduction of new specific 
diagrams: block diagrams and internal block diagrams 
replacing the usual UML Class diagram and the 
requirements diagram we will comment next. 
According to the OMG, “a requirement specifies a 
capability or condition that must (or should) be satisfied. 
SysML provides modeling constructs to represent text-based 
requirements and relate them to other modeling elements. A 
requirement can also appear on other diagrams to show its 
relationship to other modeling elements.” 
2) On SysML relations 
SysML specification includes several requirements 
relationships, allowing requirements to be refined, derived, 
satisfied, and verified among other requirements or model 
elements as shown in Figure 4. Unfortunately, the 
containment relationship only allows performing a top-down 
approach on requirements hierarchy. It does not allow a 
richer composition that may allow feature diagrams for 
example. The refine relationship offers a different approach, 
while linking a requirement to something described at a finer 
grain and eventually with a different formalism, for example 
to map a textual description to a use-case diagram. 
Elements reuse, contextual references are addressed 
across a master-copy process, allowing keeping a coherent 
management regarding requirements evolution. It does not 
take into account that the textual form in itself may be 
different from one context to another while the text remains 
the same. It also does not take into account that elements can 
be detailed but in a way that each detail is one expected 
property and not a stand-alone requirement. 
The derive relationship relates a derived requirement to 
its source requirement. It appears to look like the merged 
interpretation of the characterization and specialization 
dependencies we have defined earlier. Another mechanism 
provided is to fill requirements matrix which deals with all 
requirements derivations. Both relation and matrix insure 
traceability aspect of the requirements engineering process. 
The satisfy relationship describes how a model element 
satisfies one or more requirements. It’s the equivalent of our 
allocation relationship. It holds an operational point of view 
whereas our allocation relation is an abstract relation saying: 
This requirement is taken into account in this solution 
element and reversely, this element of solution provides an 
acceptable way to fulfill this requirement. 
The verify relationship defines how a test case or other 
model element verifies a requirement. It fits to our definition 
of the qualification relation. The specification considers the 
test-case as any generic mean to provide verification as we 
are.  
C. Modeling requirements using model-driven engineering 
tools 
1) Modeling requirements using Topcased 
(Toolkit in OPen-source for Critical Applications and 
SystEms Development) Topcased [18] is an eclipse based 
Figure 4: SysML requirements relations 
environment designed for critical systems. The fact was that 
design of critical systems requires the mix of many different 
tools over the system life-cycle. These tools targeted several 
and different aspects of the project and, in this case, for the 
modeling aspects. The idea behind Topcased was to offer 
one unique Computer Aided Software Engineering tool that 
can offer functionalities like generating, analyzing, 
transforming these different models, while enhancing 
traceability and finally improving system robustness. 
Interesting functionalities of Topcased are one 
implementation of a SysML metamodel and the possibility 
to import requirements directly from existing documents 
(with respect to some specific document formatting). Via 
regular expressions analysis, formatting rules, it is possible 
to decompose a document into a hierarchical set of 
requirements. Unfortunately, source documents must have a 
too constraining formatting and a specific requirement 
tagging policy that is not present in the documents we 
wanted to analyze, documents existing over different 
formatting. Moreover, it does not allow a complete typing of 
our elements in different elements (requirements, 
recommendations, definitions, annexes, and notes as for the 
documentation domain). 
2) Modeling requirements using Unicase 
Unicase [19] is an eclipse-based framework that offers a 
navigable and unified structure based on Unified 
Requirements Modeling Language (URML) [5]. Unicase 
allows linking scenarios with functional, non functional 
requirements, use cases and other model elements 
(customizable as it is based on EMF and Ecore) with 
standard properties (unique ID, description, priority, cost). 
Unfortunately, it focuses in navigation which is useful to 
follow evolution of referenced elements, manage 
requirements during the project life (assigning actions on 
the requirements) and enhance automatic traceability with a 
project development perspective. It does not take into 
account the ambiguity (managed as defect that should be 
fixed) or the several different interpretations possible that 
are context valid [7]. 
D.  CVL and software product lines engineering 
1) Variability in product lines 
Product lines engineering aims to improve reusability 
within a family of related systems. This family can be 
defined as a set of common elements, named core assets and 
variable elements [10] [16]. One of the key tasks being the 
identification and separation of what is common and what is 
variable. In fact, it may be a similar task as to compare two 
standards’ elements. At the same time, the other key task 
managing adaptation of these variable elements by 
orchestrating the possible configurations. 
Feature diagrams are used as representation language for 
this variability concern. Introduced by Kang [8], they offer a 
compact but exhaustive way to represent configurations of a 
product line. These configurations are expressed in term of 
features and how they can be composed, following a parent-
child relationship from the more abstract concept to the more 
concrete one.  
2) About Common Variability Language (CVL) 
Concerning the sole variability question, we way notice 
the current request for proposal from the OML around a 
Common Variability Language [3]. CVL’s objectives are to 
enable the specification of the variability in product line 
models in order to support product line modeling. One of the 
main concepts is also to promote division of labor and 
separate design concerns form variability concerns. This idea 
of weaving variability can also be found in [11] but in a 
different way as it promotes fusion of both concerns instead 
if separation. Thus, CVL will be based on four models. The 
base model is a representation of the problem without 
variability. The variability model where will be expressed 
variability. The resolution model will store the user’s choices 
regarding the configuration from the variability model. 
Finally, the resolved model will embed the derivation of the 
base model and the variability model, producing a final 
model conforming to the base metamodel. 
CVL address the question of variability at a very general 
purpose level, separating design time from variability 
analysis. Both CVL and [11] approaches should be 
promising to fit to our process by modeling our documents 
first (some kind of base model) and then, bringing the 
variability aspects.  
E. Synthesis 
Within the perspective of the three tasks to perform and 
their related operations highlighted in section III.F, we 
summarize the previous analysis in Table 1. In this table, a 
smiling face is for a concern which is taken into account with 
a good expressivity (even if it doesn’t correspond to our 
needs). A neutral face is used for concerns partially taken 
into account or without enough expressivity. A sad face is 
used for concerns not taken into account or too poorly. 
Actually, the majority of modeling tools target only one 
current context. They do not aim to deal with multiple 
contextualized interpretations. They are also badly designed 
to model intra-area dependencies as they do consider or aim 
Table 1: Approaches’ fitness on to three tasks and their operations 
to build requirements as non ambiguous, precise, clear 
artifacts. These two points represent the field of variability 
for our concerns. They do not take into account the different 
elements types we can find in standards (requirements, 
recommendations, annexes, definitions and so on) as they 
consider only requirements even if customization is still 
possible (using stereotypes, regeneration of the domain 
metamodel or attribute properties). They take into account 
inter-area depencies by using satisfying/verifying like 
relationships whereas we consider more relations have to be 
defined for comparison purposes. 
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this paper, we have defined some areas of our problem 
and dependencies that should have to be expressed regarding 
the formalization of standards, their possible interpretations 
and their relationships. With these elements defined, we have 
reviewed some modeling approaches and identify their limits 
in front of what we expect to do and the gaps we have to 
fulfill. 
Once processed, results of a standard parsing phase can 
produce model elements, which can then be enhanced with 
their different interpretations (variability aspect) and 
dependencies (traceability and analysis). 
None, to the best of our knowledge, have tried to 
leverage model-driven engineering techniques to represent 
this knowledge as model elements and consider the 
ambiguity of documents this way. Here ambiguity is 
something natural that has to be modeled and manipulated 
and not fought. Formalizing ambiguous requirements and 
providing some of their possible interpretations are a way to 
make them clearer, more sharable and reusable.  
All of the approaches lacks of expressiveness regarding 
typing or dependency links and are currently software 
development-centered. Actually, works are driven by the 
objective to build or use technical requirements, something 
that could later be addressed with a program. In our context, 
we are knowledge-centered. We want to describe several 
interpretations of the same element with rich expressivity, 
give the opportunity to analyze them, to synthesize and 
capitalize this knowledge using models. Providing a DSML 
for these variability and traceability questions and building 
this knowledge model will be the major contributions of this 
work where software is just a part a very larger whole and 
also has to be abstracted. 
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